Private Lappe's Providential Escape following the outbreak of the Pyche Raja Rebellion

It is only very rarely that we can get a glimpse into the lives of an ordinary soldier in India, let alone come across their individual names.

Here is the story of one such man, Private Lappe, who was extraordinarily lucky to survive a ferocious ambush at the outbreak of the war between the Pazhassi Rajah and the East India Company at Tellicherry.

The date that the actual battle took place is unclear, possibly before the 4th of November 1796, but certainly by the 18th of January 1797.  The following account however only appeared in the Sussex Advertiser many years later on Monday the 1st of September 1800.[1]

Had Private Lappe by that time been invalided home?

Perhaps he told his story to the local Sussex  reporter.

We will probably never know.

PROVIDENTIAL ESCAPE

A soldier, of the name of Lappe, who belonged to an European battalion, and who made his escape from the Jungle, after the action between a detachment of Europeans and Sepoys belonging to the Bombay Army, and the insurgents in the Cotiote country, has related the following" miraculous “ account of his gaining the British Military post, after the defeat of the detachment, given at Bombay, the 4th of November:—"I was shot, says Lappe) about noon, with a musket ball, in my right breast; and, to resist or escape being utterly impossible, as the only means left me to save my life, I threw myself down among the mortally wounded and the dead, without moving hand or foot. Here, in the evening, the Chief Surveying his conquest, ordered a Jamedar to begin instantly to dispatch those who were likely to survive. This fellow, having already killed Captain Bowman, and several other Europeans, left the remainder to die of themselves, or to fall a prey to the voraciousness of the wild creatures with which the Jungle abounds; for in places it is almost impenetrable. They then filed off to the right, towards the hills, carrying along with them five or six prisoners alive; I believe they were all Sepoys but one, with their hands tied behind their backs, of whom I never since have heard. When I apprehended these sanguinary rebels had entirely left the scene of action, it being very quiet, and rather dark, I found means, on my hands and feet, to creep out from among the carnage, for many men were killed that day by the Rajah's troops, owing to our force having been weakened by sending it in small detachments into the Jungle, where they had never before been, and the enemy firing at them in ambush, where it was impossible to trace them: I got at length at some distance from the place where I lay, and met another of our party, who was less wounded than myself, with whom, after some days wandering in torment and despair, not knowing which way to proceed for fear of being intercepted, we at last fortunately arrived at the military post, worn out with fatigue and the loss of blood, where, we understood, the account of the defeat had been received four days before.

The news slowly spread out from London to the regional towns of England and Scotland.  Many families with relations in India must have anxiously wondered what had been happening in the passing months, it took news to travel around the globe.

On Saturday 5th July 1797, readers in Norfolk came across the following report in their newspaper.

We learn from the Coast of Coromandel, that on the 18th of January [1797] the Rajah of the Cotiote had commenced hostilities against us, and that Captain Bowman and Lieutenant Bond, who had been sent to take possession of One of his strong holds, had, the perfidy of their guide, been led into defile, where they were both killed with most the Sepoys of their party. Captain Lawrence, who went to relief, was like wise led into a defile, from whence he fought his way to a pagoda, where passed the night and following day, till permitted to proceed with his party to Tillicherry. Captain Troy, on his return from a muster of the native troops, had been killed, and Captain Shean desperately wounded. Twenty-four Sepoys were killed, and 50 wounded and missing. General Stuart immediately appointed Major Anderson to march against the Rajah with 250 of the Bombay regiment, a detachment of light artillery, 1,000 Sepoys, and Mopals.

Over the following weeks, more details came out from Leadenhall Street. Readers of the Oxford Journal on Saturday the 29th of July 1797, were given more details about the outbreak started by the Pychy Rajah.

From the Madras Gazette, January 28. By letters from the Malabar coast of the 15th instant, we have been advertised of the revolt of the Cotiote Rajah on that coast, who is said to have commenced his refractory conduct on the 28th instant, by firing on a detachment of Sepoys under the command of Capt. Lawrence, in the neighbourhood of Cootiungarry. On the same day, Capt. Bowman and Lieut. Bond were sent with a detachment to take possession of a strong hold, near the last mentioned place, and were decoyed by an Hircarrah, employed on the occasion, into a narrow defile, where, a strong party of Nairs, in ambuscade, availing them selves of the disadvantageous situation of the detachment, and their mode of attack, beset the party with a ferocity peculiarly their own, when Captain Bowman and Lieutenant Bond were almost immediately overpowered and killed. Several Sepoys, it is also added, were killed and wounded on the spot. Captain Lawrence, on hearing the report of the musquetry, proceeded with all possible expedition, at the head of a body of grenadiers, towards the succour and support of Captain Bowman's detachment; but having experienced a similar breach of faith in his guide, was also attacked in the same defile, but after a warm and fortunate resistance effected his retreat, and took post in a Pagoda the whole night, and part of the next day, hemmed in by upwards of a thousand of the Rajah's troops. On the 9th, however, he was permitted to retire with his men to Tellicherry. In addition to the above melancholy relation, Captain Troy, who had been employed in mustering the native troops, and Captain Shean on his return from a visit, fell in with a party of these sanguinary savages, who having surrounded them, coolly and unprovokedly put the first to death, and wounded the latter in a shocking and barbarous manner. General Stuart, to whom the intelligence was sent to Cannanore, recommended to Major Anderson immediately to take the field to punish so daring an outrage. The force to be assembled for this purpose, will consist of 250 men of the Bombay regiment under the command of Captain Grammant. A detachment of artillery, with light guns, about one thousand Sepoys, together with a Corps of Mopals, consisting of about 200, raised expressly for the purpose of hunting and counteracting the Nairs in the woods and fortresses. The unhappy fate of so many officers, in being cut off from their friends' and relations, in this cruel and insidious manner, cannot be too much lamented; and provides a melancholy example of the inherent ferocity which has ever been the characteristic of the cast of Nairs.


[1] The Old Soldier's Story - Edward Bird (1772–1819), ca 1808.
[2] These reports and many more from British regional newspapers going back to 1700 are now available at http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/

"Ferocity .. characteristic of the cast of Nairs" 1799

Like many insurgencies the war against the Pazhassi Raja was a brutal one, with both sides on occasion taking heavy losses.

Later accounts published in the 19th Century tend to picture the British winning battles over the various Indian forces with comparative ease.

This was often not in fact the case, and as the following news paper account makes clear the insurgents were often able to inflict heavy casualties onto the East India Company forces.

From the Whitehall Evening Post
Saturday, July 20, to Tuesday, July 23, 1799.

Authentic Particulars respecting the primary Rupture with the COTIOTE RAJAH, recently received from India. Captain Bowman and Lieutenant Bond were sent with a detachment to take possession of a stronghold near Cootungarry, and were decoyed by a Hircarrah,[1] employed on the occasion, into a narrow defile, where a strong party of Nairs in ambuscade, availing themselves of the disadvantageous situation of the detachment, and their mode of attack, beset the party with a ferocity peculiarly their own, when Captain Bowman and Lieutenant Bond were almost immediately over powered and killed. Several Sepoys were also killed and wounded on the spot. Captain Lawrence, on hearing the report of the musquetry, proceeded, with all possible expedition, at the head of a body of grenadiers, towards the succour and support of Captain Bowman’s detachment: but having experienced a similar breach of faith in his guide, was also attacked in the same defile: but, after a warm and fortunate resistance, effected his retreat, and took post in a pagoda the whole night and part of the next day, hemmed in by upwards of a thousand of the Rajah’s troops.

Captain Troy, who had been employed in mustering the Native troops, and Captain Shean, on his return from a visit, fell in with a party of these sanguinary savages, who, having surrounded them, coolly and unprovokedly put the first to death, and wounded the latter in a shocking and barbarous manner. It would appear, from the foregoing circumstances that the inhuman wretches chiefly aimed at the destruction of the Officers: but particularly from their subsequent barbarity, the bodies of Capt. Troy and Lieutenant Bond having been since found decapitated; their heads, as it is supposed, having been sent to the Rajah – the copse of Captain Bowman was snatched from a similar fate of so many Officers, in being cut off from their relations and friends in this cruel and insidious manner, cannot be too much lamented, and furnishes a melancholy example of the inherent ferocity which has ever been characteristic of the cast of Nairs.

I cannot locate any other sources for this action, or indeed details of these officers. It is almost as if they have been edited out of the record.

I would be very grateful if you are able to recognise any of the people in the account, or can tell me anything about their lives or units before this defeat cut short their lives.

Where is "Cootungarry?"

I would like to thank Dr Oliver Noone for bringing this newspaper account to my notice.

[1] Hircarrah, variant of HURCARRA, HIRCARA , &c., s. Hind. harkārā, 'a messenger, a courier; an emissary, a spy' (Wilson). The etymology, according to the same authority, is har, 'every,' kār, 'business.' The word became very familiar in the Gilchristian spelling Hurkaru, from the existence of a Calcutta newspaper bearing that title (Bengal Hurkaru, generally enunciated by non Indians as Hurkĕroó), for the first 60 years of last century, or thereabouts. Courtesy of Hobson Jobson. See http://dsal.uchicago.edu/dictionaries/hobsonjobson/

"Indian Atrocities."

Not all of the British Officers approved of the way the East India Company had conducted wars in India.

Many of them must have suffered badly from the constant strain of fighting these wars, and many of them must have returned home to Britain seriously ill and with a very uncertain future.

In 1805, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder had not even been considered, and yet it must have existed.

Here is a very different account of what it had been like to fight the Pazhassi Raja, from those generally presented in publications from this period.

The following account written by George Strachan in 1817 paints a grim picture of the reality behind the war with the Raja. —

The details with which I have promised to finish you on the subject of my ten year-servitude in the northern peninsula of India, I hereby commence.

In 1790, at the age of 17, I was appointed a Cadet on the Bombay establishment with about seventy Cadets of the same Season. Of these there are not above twenty of the establishment, who have survived the effects of a noxious climate, and the fatigues of that hateful service of which I was engaged. In 1800, I was appointed senior Ensign of the Bombay European regiment, then engaged in the Cotiote war, where in less than ten years that regiment lost not less than twenty-five Officers out of thirty, and eight hundred men out of the full complement of one thousand. In 1801, I was promoted to be Lieutenant, and transferred to the 4d battalion, 3d native regiment engaged on the same service. The mortality was not less than in the former corps. Here I shall beg leave to describe the nature of the Cotiote war.—A more cruel and vindictive system of proscription was never practised by the most barbarous nation towards its foe, than that which was employed by the Bombay Government towards the Rajah of the Cotiote, hitherto the staunch ally, friend, and tributary, of the Company. Those facts, with which I became acquainted, have never been presented in any shape to the public eye. Indeed the bye-laws of the company would have made it almost treason in any of their servants to have exposed the secrets of the cruel system of extirpation, pursued towards this inoffending people, who from time immemorial had led a life of primitive and pastoral simplicity, attached to their sovereign by every motive of moral and religious obligation, to a degree of enthusiasm surpassing that of any other race of men, under a monarchical government, since the world began.

The Cotiote is that part of the Malabar coast which is between the sea-shore, and the Bella Ghaut mountain inland from Calicut, Tillichery, and Cairaone. It is for the most part covered with jungles or forests, interspersed with fruitful vallies, and in many places with impenetrable thickets, in which the ferocious tiger and other wild beasts entrench themselves in safety from the pursuit of man. It is about forty miles in breadth and sixty in length. Its produce — pepper, rice, and vegetables. Its population, now extinct, did not originally exceed 6000 men of the cast or tribe, called Nairs. This warlike people, determined to perish in the cause of their oppressed sovereign. And such was the dear bought victory obtained over them, that we lost in a contest which lasted ten years nearly as many men as our victims; till hunted down like beasts of prey, this race of brave men (who had been proclaimed rebels) were at length extirpated by fire and sword from the face of the earth. Nothing now remains of this people save the country which they inhabited, and that is become a barren and uncultivated desert The Bullum Rajah is the sovereign of another nation, bordering upon the Cotiote, which was at nearly the same time devoted to proscription and hunted down in like manner under the late General Stevenson, of the Madras cavalry.

The Cotiote war was terminated by the late Colonel Montresore, of the 80th regiment, in 1804, when, as if to throw a veil over these transactions; the Malabar coast was transferred to the Madras Government, who now occupy it.

The Cotiote Rajah had previously assisted the Company in their war with Hyder Ally, and furnished 1000 armed men, who distinguished themselves under our banners, in expelling Hyder from the possession of Саnnanore. ' Ungrateful as the treatment this high-minded prince and people -afterwards experienced from their European neighbours, to whom they supplied the whole produce of their cultivation, the 'task of recording their sufferings- in the heart rending scenes of cold-blooded slaughter, which this picturesque country every were presented to our view, is nevertheless painful to me. It fell to my lot, with a detachment of Sepoys, to command at Pyche, the Rajah's capital, whence he had been expelled; not one of his subjects had remained behind, but they had taken up arms, and followed his desperate fortunes in the field. Thus was I enabled to detail those atrocities, at the relation of which Englishmen here at home must be horror -struck, and to which they can scarcely give credit: but the facts related defy contradiction, and can be attested by respectable persons, lately arrived in England, who were also engaged in that campaign.

This brave but fugitive Indian Prince was alternatively attacking or retreating from the detachments in pursuit of him through the forests. Sometimes in one of these rencontres we have lost 800 men. His force being dispersed, he had taken refuge in one lone house, with not above 10 or 12 armed followers. These chose rather to be cut to pieces than surrender, and thus favoured his escape, fighting sword in hand till they fell to a man in defence of his person. This was at a time when a large reward and pardon were offered to his subjects if they would discover his retreat, in order to lead to his decapitation ; otherwise no quarter was given. Their towns, houses, and fields of standing corn, were burnt down. On every rising ground and road-side, 20 or 30 bodies were seen hanging to a gibbet, and some promiscuously upon trees. The prisoners taken were either immediately so disposed of, or shot and bayoneted upon the spot ; and such was the spirit of desperate resistance and despair manifested on the part of this unhappy people, that, unnatural as it may appear, they actually cut the throats of their own wives and children, ¡n order to prevent their falling into our bands.

The Canute Nambier, and 'others of his nobles, having been taken prisoners, were ordered for execution. Captain J--, a brother officer and valuable friend of mine, now in England, was commanded to see that order enforced. That Gentleman, in a letter I received from him on the occasion, which does honour to the liberal sentiments of his mind, described this reluctant duty with horror and pity, though mixed with admiration at the heroic firmness of those noble Indians. They faithfully adhered to their Sovereign down to the awful moment of yielding up their lives in his cause. The offer held out to them by the British Government was, a free pardon and an ample reward, provided they would discover the Rajah's retreat!

These terms were, even in their last moments, rejected with indignation. They voluntarily stretched out their hands to receive the rope, and putting it round their necks, were launched into another World, which to them afforded a nobler reward, and a brighter hope."[1]

It is not easy to find much about the life and career of George Strachan. In 1817 he was described as "Mr George Strachan - formerly a lieutenant Bombay Establishment in consideration of his extreme poverty and distress."

He was granted a political pension of £50 per year. This amount was very small. Retiring Major's could expect about £400 a year.

It is probable that Strachan had chosen quite deliberately to get his piece published by the Examiner, in order to embarrass the East India Company.

This paper had a Radical viewpoint and had been established in 1808 by John Hunt. Both John and his brother Leigh were to serve time in Surrey County Gaol for an attack on the Prince Regent in 1813. The Hunts were visited by Byron, John Moore, Lord Brougham and Charles Lamb. [2]

Three years later the EIC would prepare a copy minute on the request of George Strachan, late Lt 3rd Bombay NI, to be restored to the service. [3]



[1] Published in the Examiner Volume 9, for the year 1818. Page 594 and 595.
[2] See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leigh_Hunt
[3] Military Department Special Collections: Collection 14a IOR/L/MIL/5/377, Coll 14a 1820

Cotaparamba & Montana Forts. Arthur Wellesley & the Pazhassi Rajah

Figure 1. Google Earth Image showing the locations of Cotaparamba and Montana. Click on the image for a larger version.

During the wars against the Pazhassi Raja some of the fiercest battles occurred at the foot of the Ghats around the modern towns of Koothuparamba and Mattanur.

At the commencement of the early 19th Century these small towns were minor settlements that became the sites of East India Company [EIC] forts called Cotaparamba and Montana. These forts commanded strategic cross roads on the main routes from the coast towards Coorg, the Wayanad, and Mysore.

These routes were vital to the EIC armies strategic mobility, because they had previously enabled the EIC Army to threaten Tipu Sultan's Mysore from the west coast in 1792 and 1799 as well as from the Coast of Coromandel. These tracks were also used by Brinjarries [1] to transport salt into the interior in exchange for rice and grain from Coorg and Mysore.

The forts were located right in the middle of the Pazhassi Rajah's home territory, and were situated along tracks previously cut by Tipu Sultan's army that the British intended to turn into defensive stop lines in order to prevent attacks by the Rajah against the Anjarakandy [2] pepper estates recently established by the EIC and Murdoch Brown. These tracks would also enable patrols to cut the Raja off from his sources of supply base located in his former possessions.

The battles around these key strategic sites at the foot of the Ghats in the Pazhassi Rajah's home territory were prolonged and gave Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington considerable cause for concern at the time.

The purpose of this blog is to try to see if any remains of these two forts still remain in-situ?

If you happen to read this blog and you live nearby to either of these two locations, I would be very grateful if you would have a look at the following locations when next you pass by.

It is entirely possible that traces of the sites of two of the fiercest battles fought by the Pazhassi Rajah against troops under the command of the future Duke of Wellington survive in the form of earthworks or ruins of former foundations.

We have several descriptions of Cotaparamba Fort, and the best that I have found so far is that provided by Col. James Welsh written in 1821.

"On the 6th of February 1821, I was appointed by Sir Thomas Munro to command the provinces of Malabar and Canara, vacant by the death of Lieutenant-colonel Lindsey. The principal part of the journey being through places already mentioned, I shall pass over the whole till we left the foot of the Periah Pass, when proceeding by a new road to Cannanore, we arrived first at Canote, twelve miles from the bungalow at Nuddumbrseshawle; our old friend Mr. Baber, the Circuit Judge, having kindly come out to meet us the day before. This is a small place on the high road, with a little bridge over a small mountain stream ; and it is in a wild and beautiful spot, abounding with all kinds of game.

Our next march was to Cotaparamba, eight miles onward, an old square fort, on a commanding eminence, having a house in each of the bastions, and a delightful view in every direction. The Pioneers doing duty in Malabar and Canara, were at that time stationed at this place, under Lieutenant Rowley; and from it's height above the surrounding country, and more above the level of the sea, it must be both cool and healthy. Half-way between this place and Cannanore, there is a wide and deep river, over which a capital stone bridge was' erected a few years back by Captain Ravenshaw, of the Engineers; and the high road, which formerly went round some miles by Tellicherry, had now been made to pass directly through it."[3]

Figure 2. Possible Location of Cotaparamba Fort.
Click on the image for a larger version.

Lieutenants Ward and Conner also describe this fort, however they transcribed the name rather differently as Tullaparambu rather than Cotaparamba. Perhaps they found it had to turn the Malayalam into English.

The settlement that Ward and Conner called Kotium or Kotangady is known today as Kottayam.

"Kotium also called Kotangady, from a Moplah Bazar and mosques to the S. of another palace, belonging to the Pychee Rajah, at present in a neglected state, to the E. of it is a sheet [of] deep water about 1/2 a mile around - it lies N.E. 6 1/2 miles of Tellicherry. Tullaparambu on the high road to the Peria Pass lies one mile E. of Kotium - there is a small redoubt with 4 bastions, on two of them bungalows are built for the accommodation of travellers, to S. is a street of Bazars kept mostly by herdsmen and natives of the Eastern Coast. The roads from Cannanore and Tellicherry meet at this post."[4]

From the following Google Earth Image onto which I have superimposed a scale line one mile long, clearly shows that Tullaparambu. or Cotaparamba are the same location, and that it is very likely that the fort stood where the modern rectangular compound is located.

What is this compound used for today?

Is it a school, or perhaps the site of a mosque?

Was it perhaps formerly a temple?

Did the EIC take over and fortify a former temple site perhaps?

Figure 3. Google Earth Image showing the relationship between Cotaparambu and Kotium or Kottayam, as well as a one mile scale line superimposed onto the image. The former Kottayam Palace that had belonged to the Pazhassi Rajah and its associated lake can clearly be seen as described by Ward & Conner.
Click on the image for a larger version.

These two forts appear to have been built at the express command of Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington. In late March 1800, Wellesley had travelled west from Seringapatam through Coorg and down the pass to Cannanore. He was in command of troops operating in South Mahratta Country, Coorg, Canara and the Northern Malabar.

He reached Cannanore on the 3rd of April, and like many travellers coming down the ghats from Coorg, which he had thought similar to Ireland, he felt the greatly increased heat and humidity on the coast.

"Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close.

' My Dear Colonel, ' Cannanore, 3rd April, 1800.

I arrived here this morning, having been on the road one day longer than I expected. I found the weather exceedingly hot, and a want of water upon the road to refresh the followers and cattle obliged me to make two marches, where, under other circumstances, I should have made only one. We have, however, had rain nearly every night since I left Seringapatam.

I met here Mr. Smee and Captain Moncrieffe. The former has induced some of the nairs, under his influence, Kydree Amboo at their head, to commence to open a road from Cotaparamba by Mananderry to Tutucullum and Canote, and another by Pyche to Montana; the latter will not be difficult, as Tippoo had made one on the same line formerly. It is intended, if possible, before the rains, to establish a post at Canote, and another at Montana, to connect them by a road directly across from one to the other, and by another road between them by Perrywell, which last requires only to be opened. Mr. Smee has no doubt but that the nairs will effect these objects; and in order to facilitate them, I have sent in the pioneers and 1200 of the coolies, which had been hired for the expedition. If the Pyche Rajah is disposed to make an opposition to this measure (which Smee and Moncriefi'e think he will not), it must then be given over ; as all parties agree that the force in this country is not sufficient to carry it through. If it should be necessary to give over the plan, Smee does not apprehend that the Company's influence will be diminished in consequence of the failure, and as every yard of road which is made is so much gained towards effecting the great object, I have, upon the whole, thought it a measure which ought to be attempted. Excepting thirty men employed in guarding Kydree Amboo's house, not a sepoy will be engaged in the operation; so that however anxiously I may look forward for its success, I do not conceive that the honour of the Company's arms will be engaged in it. As soon as the roads will have been completed; or if it should be necessary to discontinue them, or, at all events, at the commencement of the monsoon, the coolies will be employed in carrying provisions to Cotaparamba, where I understand there are sheds and buildings sufficient to contain provisions for 3000 men for two months. If it, should be possible to make posts at Montana and Canote, they must, in the first instance, be held by the friendly nairs till we can move forward our provisions, first for a garrison, next for the number of men, and for the time above stated.

It will be a curious circumstance, if without troops we should be able to effect objects which it was imagined the largest detachment which could conveniently be brought together could not undertake; but it is to be observed that they will be effected by the nairs themselves, with the assistance of our people, and not by our force.

I have heard from Colonel Mignan that he had received a report from the officer commanding the post at Soobramany, stating that Kistnapah Naig had beat the Rajah's troops, and had taken Munserabad on the 24th of March. As I have not heard from you, or from Colonel Tolfrey, I conclude that there is no truth in the report; but if it should be true, we must only send off the flank companies of the 77th, now at Seringapatam, in readiness to march to Tolfrey's assistance, with orders to storm Munserabad.

I enclose a copy of Colonel Mignan's letter.

Believe me, &c. ' Lieut. Colonel Close. ' ' Arthur Wellesley.[5]

Arthur Wellesley went on to visit Tellicherry during this journey. His presence at Tellicherry is demonstrated by the following letter that he wrote on the 9th of April 1800 concerning the minting of new coinage.

To W. H. Gordon, Esq.

SlR, Tellicherry, 9th April, 1800.

I have received your report upon the proposed coinage of the Bengal gold mohurs and Soolack rupees in your treasury into Rajah's pagodas and rupees. By this it appears that, valuing the Rajah's pagoda at 8 per cent. above the star, each gold mohur will produce 4 star pagodas 16 fanams 11 1/2 cash, and more if the difference in value be increased.

It appears that by coining the Soolack rupees into Rajah's rupees, a loss will be incurred of about 5| per cent., supposing the Soolack rupee to be now worth as much as the Rajah's, which is not the case. As, however, upon the whole, the loss will be the less to the Company if the gold mohurs and Soolack rupees are recoined as above mentioned than if they are issued to the troops in their present form, and as to issue them in Rajah's pagodas and rupees will be more convenient, I request that you will have them recoined.

I have, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.[6]

On the 10th of April 1800, Colonel Wellesley rode out to Cotaparamba, which he describes as follows..

"I went this morning to Cotaparamba, which is a neat little mud redoubt about nine miles from hence. It contains buildings which will hold a large quantity of provision and ammunition, with which, please God, they shall be filled in a few days. The road-making goes on well, and has not been interrupted. On the day after to-morrow I shall occupy Pyche fort on the Montana road, and Monanderry pagoda on that leading to Canote, and I hope in a few days afterwards to be able to take possession of the posts, which will be constructed at Montana and Canote."[7]

By the 13th of April 1800 Colonel Wellesley had moved back to Cannanore Fort.

Whilst there he wrote the following long letter and memorandum of instruction to Lt. Colonel Sartorius. In this memo he clearly instructs Sartorius to construct the two posts at Cotaparamba and Montana.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Sartorius.

Sir, Cannanore, 13th April, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 9th instant, and have taken into consideration its enclosures regarding the claim of the Moplahs to be retained in the Company's service till after the monsoon.

In my opinion they have no foundation whatever for such a claim ; and even if the inconveniences to be apprehended were greater than that stated by Lieutenant Osborne in his letter, I should think they ought to be discharged. To act otherwise would tend to disclose to the Moplahs the plans of Government for a future season, would answer no good purpose, would be expensive, and is not rendered necessary by the engagement entered into by you. This engagement states that the Moplahs are to receive two months' pay after the expiration of the war, that is to say, after the period when their services are no longer required, and they are discharged. In my opinion, they are discharged at this moment; and although they may be wanted again, their entering the service will depend upon themselves, and will be the consequence of another bargain to be made with them. They ought therefore in justice to receive the two months' pay from the day on which they were discharged from the service. It is true that this sudden discharge was not in contemplation when the bargain was made, but that by no means alters its tenor.

The desire which I have that all engagements made with the natives should be strictly adhered to, and the probability which exists that the services of these Moplahs will soon be required again, induce me to wish that they should receive their pay for two months from the day on which they were informed that their services would not be required. But it appears that they do not deem that they have a claim to this allowance; but they ask to be kept in the service in the expectation of being employed after the rains.

If that should be the case, it will be clear that they did not understand that the Company was bound to pay them for two months after their discharge, excepting they had been in the field. It will not then be necessary to pay them.

Upon the whole, I request that you will act as you. think proper; and I give you my opinion that if the Moplahs think themselves entitled to two months' pay, they ought to get it, as there is no doubt that by the engagement they are entitled to it.

I have, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.


Memoranda for Colonel Sartorius.

1. As soon as possible, it will be proper that a sufficiency of grain for two months for 3000 Natives, and of arrack for the same period for 800 Europeans, and a large quantity of musket ammunition, should be placed in Cotaparamba.

2. When the roads will be completed to Montana by Pyche, and to Tutucullum or Canote by Mananderry, posts are to be established at Montana and Canote, and they are to be held by detachments of the Company's troops. A road is to be made, if possible, direct from Montana to Canote.

3. Although these posts may be established, and held, it will be proper that a small detachment should remain in Pyche Fort and in Mananderry, in order to secure the communication between Cotaparamba and the new posts.

4. When the posts at Montana and Canote and the necessary buildings will have been finished, and the road between them completed, it will be proper to move forward to those posts the grain and provisions and ammunition above requested to be laid in at Cotaparamba.

5. It will be proper that there should be at least one gun, if not two, in each of the posts at Canote and Montana.

6. As it is said that the Pyche Rajah will endeavour to prevent the making of the proposed roads to Montana and to Canote, it will not be proper under the present circumstances to risk a contest to force it: but at whatever place the road may have arrived when he will attempt to stop it, it will be proper to construct a redoubt, provided the situation is fit for it; and this redoubt must be kept filled with stores, &c., &c., in the same manner as above requested with regard to the posts to be established at Canote and Montana.

7. After the posts will have been completed at Canote and Montana, it will be proper, if possible, to continue the road on to Pereweil, and in a direction which will be pointed out by Captain Moncrieff.

8. There are two rivers on the road between Cotaparamba and Montana, and one or two on that to Canote. These rivers are not fordable during the rainy season. It will be proper to have a jungar upon each of them, platformed as is that between Tellicherry and Cotaparamba. As in case an attempt should be made upon either of these posts, the jungars would immediately be destroyed in order to prevent assistance from reaching them, it will be proper that a certain number of boats, platforms, &c., should be laid up in Cotaparamba in order to avoid the inconvenience of waiting till boats to cross the rivers could be brought from the coast.

9. It will be proper to reinforce Cotaparamba, in order that the commanding officer there may be able to give assistance to any of the posts in advance which may be attacked.

10. A few of the Bombay coolies will be kept during the rainy season.

11. As there are no arms at Mangalore, as the troops there are employed in the field, and their arms are totally unserviceable, I request that Colonel Sartorius will send to Mangalore from the arsenal at Cannanore 300 stand of arms.

12. The troops stationed in the Cotiote country may be supposed at all times liable to be attacked ; their arms are in bad order, and they ought to have new arms without delay.

Arthur Wellesley.[8]

It is clear from the memorandum above that Cotaparamba was going to be an important forward operating base during the months to come. The monsoon would arrive in the area within a few weeks, and he wished to get his troops into cover by then. He also needed to ensure that his men had supplies because it would become very difficult to supply them once the rivers filled with the runoff from the Monsoon.

Wellesley wrote to Bombay to explain his thinking behind the recent orders he had given to Lieut. Col. Sartorius.

The Pazhassi Rajah was already an experienced proponent of guerilla warfare, at least a decade before the term came into common usage in Spain, where Arthur Wellesley later supported Spanish irregular forces against Napoleon's armies. It is highly probable that Wellesley's experience of being on the receiving end of "guerilla" attacks, by the Pazhassi Rajah's adherents, would influence his thinking in Spain a decade later.

Wellesley and his predecessors had been trying to bring the Rajah to battle since 1797, and like most regular troops faced by guerilla attacks, they had found this very hard to do.

It is quite possible that Arthur Wellesley in April 1800, was beginning to come to terms with fighting insurgents, and had decided to try to force the Rajah into battle by building these roads and forts into the heartland of the Rajah's former territories. In this way perhaps he hoped to force the Rajah to come out of the jungle to attack these forts and road building parties.

To the Adjutant-General, Bombay.

Sir, Seedapoor, 17th April, 1800.

Since I had the honour of addressing the Secretary of Government, the roads which I then stated were making have been completed to Pyche and to Mananderry. These posts were to be occupied by the Company's troops.

There was every reason to believe that the roads would soon be completed to Montana and to Canote, at which places I have directed that redoubts and buildings for containing provisions and stores may be constructed, and that the two posts may be connected by a road across from the one to the other.

I have desired that a large quantity of provisions and ammunition may be thrown into Cotaparamba without loss of time ; and as soon as the posts at Montana and Canote will be constructed and connected with each other, and held by the Company's troops, these articles will be removed to them. Pyche and Mananderry will still be kept during the rains, in order to secure and render more easy the communication between Cotaparamba and the more advanced posts at Montana and Canote ; and I have directed Colonel Sartorius to place platformed jungars [9] upon the rivers which cross the roads, and are not fordable during the monsoon. He will besides place boats, &c., in Cotaparamba, in order that in case any attempt should be made on the advanced posts, and the jungars should be destroyed to prevent them from receiving relief, it may be possible to ford them without waiting for boats to be sent for from the sea-coast.

In this manner arrangements have been made for establishing and securing posts in the centre of the Cotiote country, which will materially forward the operations of the troops at the opening of the ensuing season.[10]

The pioneers under Captain Moncrieff were tasked with cutting the roads to link up the forts at Cotaparamba and Montana. They were soon coming under attack from the Pazhassi Rajah's men.

Captain Ward commanded the base at Cotaparamba, and he was expected to support and maintain contact with the working parties on the new road and at Fort Montana.

It appears that the fort at Montana came under siege during the period between May and August 1800. Reinforcements had to be sent up from the coast at Cannanore, and these were commanded by Major Holmes.

The first of these relief columns must have fought their way through in late July or early August 1800.

"Provincial Orders, Cananore, Aug. 8, 1800.

Col. Sartorious requests Maj. Holmes will accept his warmest thanks for his zealous and active exertions in the relief of Montana. The commanding-officer's sincere thanks are also due to the whole of the officers and men employed, for their gallant and steady conduct, as reported by Maj. Holmes; without which, the obstacles they had to encounter could not have been overcome, in performing the services they have effected." [11]

The following dispatch by Wellesley describes the campaign he hoped to fight.

"Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close.

My DEAR Colonel, Camp at Kittoor, 10th August, 1800.

I omitted to answer one part of your letter of the 1st instant regarding Reyman Beg, the prisoner at Nundydroog. In my opinion, unless Baba Saheb gives his consent, he cannot be punished, but that may probably be obtained through the means of Captain Kirkpatrick.

Nothing new here. Stevenson is crossing the Malpoorba at Kanapoor, and I am making preparations to cross it at Sungoly. If my native friends were a little alert, I should have twenty boats ready to-morrow.

I heard from Webbe last night, and I am very much concerned to find that he is not going to Poonah. Among other things, he informs me that the five companies of the 12th, and the 2nd of the 5th,. are coming up the ghauts, as he says, to enable me to oppose the Rajahs in Malabar. I have already ordered these corps to Seringapatam, there to remain encamped under the Caryghaut hill till further orders; and I have ordered guns to be equipped for them at that place, and every thing else to be prepared.

The question is, in what manner shall they be employed against the Rajahs in Malabar? In my opinion they ought to go below the ghauts as soon as the weather will permit, if Purneah's people are able to keep the Rajah at all within bounds on the Mysore side of Wynaad; and if I hear from you that that is the case, I shall order them to Cannanore without loss of time. The season will be fair by the time that they will receive my orders, after I shall have heard from you.

If they are to oppose the Pyche Rajah on the side of Wynaad, they must, I am afraid, remain on the defensive, as they are not sufficiently strong by themselves to enter that jungly country; and I am besides informed that it will be impossible to commence operations in it till the month of November.

It may be possible to open the campaign early in Cotiote, and push forward the roads, and establish ourselves at the foot, if not on the top, of the ghauts; and then, if I am in luck, I shall have settled matters here before November, and can march down to Wynaad, and settle matters there before the setting in of the next rains.

Let me hear from you as soon as you can respecting the ability of Purneah's troops to confine the Rajah to his jungles.

Believe me, etc. ' Lieut. Colonel Close. ' Arthur Wellesley.

Kistnapah arrived this morning. The 19th not come yet.'"[12]

Wellesley was annoyed that the bush hadn't been cut back far enough on either side of the roads between the camps, to allow for sufficient fields of fire for escorting parties, to be able to fight their way through.

"Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close.

' My Dear Colonel, ' Camp at Hoobly, 20th August, 1800.

I return the papers from Major Walker. I had before received accounts from Malabar of the relief of the two posts. These roads will not answer unless they do as I desired them at first; that is, cut the underwood to a considerable distance on each side of the road. I have ordered Sartorius to employ the pioneers and coolies on this work immediately, as whatever may be the plan for the next campaign, the communication with Montana must be made secure, or all will be lost. It will be fortunate if Purneah can check the Nairs on the Mysore side; if he cannot, the 12th and 2nd of the 5th must go that way.

If he can check them they shall go to Malabar; and I will send orders to begin by pushing the roads to the foot of the ghauts. Major Walker's plan of having a force assembled in Mysore, to give room for apprehension in that quarter, would be excellent, if we had troops in Malabar to stand even upon the defensive, or to make such improvements in our roads and posts as are necessary to their security, and to give us the means hereafter of deriving a full advantage from them. But they are so weak in Malabar, their force is so dispersed, and it is so difficult to persuade the commissioners to allow it to be collected, that I am afraid we shall suffer in Cotiote if we should not be able to send thither this reinforcement. However, Mysore is the first object, and if Purneah cannot stop the Nairs, the 12th and 2nd of the 5th must.

I hope to be able to march on the 22nd. Dhoondiah is in a bad way; his people are starving, are leaving him, and reproach him with their misfortunes. He retorts upon them, and desires them to give their wives and daughters to the Europeans, whom they are afraid to fight. This is the report, and that the Patans have left him.

All my arrangements are made, and in a few days I shall press upon him at all points at the same moment.

Believe me, etc. ' Lieut. Colonel Close.' ' Arthur Wellesley."[13]

By August Colonel Arthur Wellesley was travelling and campaigning many miles to the north near Dharwar and Hubly trying to pacify the surrounding districts in the aftermath of Tipu Sultan's defeat. The Mahrattas and Pindaris were making the most of their opportunities to take over parts of Tipu's former empire. In the middle of this important campaign Wellesley had also to take steps to prevent the Pazhassi Rajah from capitalising on the success of his attack at Montana.

"Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close.

My Dear Colonel, ' Camp at Hoobly, 21st August, 1800.

I have just received your letter of the 18th. I am afraid that the attempt to establish a depot at Hurryhur, or on the Werdah, would ruin us entirely, as I should find that the brinjarries, who of course, like the other dealers, object to coming to such a distance, would lodge their rice at the depdt instead of bringing it forward. It would be impossible to frame any arrangement to prevent that, and the idea must therefore be laid aside, although it would certainly be desirable to have a depot, and the nearer the better.

If the dealers from Mysore do not like to come forward, it cannot be helped, we must do without them.

The loss at Montana was very great certainly; but not so much so as is represented by the commissioners whose letters I return. There is a post half way between Cotaparamba and Montana, called Pyche, which was abandoned, but since the roads have been made, at the particular desire of Sartorius, who had not troops to take care of it. My opinion is, that the Pyche Rajah will now withdraw his people from both those posts in Cotiote, where he has lost many men, and that he will direct his efforts to the Mysore side. If he does withdraw, they should lose no time in throwing in a further supply to Montana, and in making such improvements on the roads as will render the communication more easy in future.

I see no reason why all the troops that can be spared should not be immediately collected, be pushed forward to Cotaparamba, and employed to cover the working parties upon the road between the river and Montana."[14]

That the battle to maintain contact with the Fort at Montana was a protracted one, involving several convoys being fought through from the coast is clear from the following letters sent to Major Holmes during the autumn of 1800.

Brigade-Major Spens to Major Holmes.

" Cananore, Oct. 1, 1800. " Sir, — I am directed by Col. Sartorious to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ult., and to convey to you his most warm thanks for having, with so much judgment, with the detachment under your command, overcome every difficulty in executing the arduous and severe service of the last relief of Montana: and he begs you will make known, in the most public manner, to Captains Baird and Howden, and to all the officers and men of your detachment, his sense of their persevering exertions on this trying occasion, and which he will have great pleasure in reporting to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley.—I have," &c.

Arthur Wellesley's troops were under significant pressure maintaining the forts that Wellesley had commanded be set up. It is clear that several actions took place in the months after August 1800.

The Hon. Colonel Wellesley to Colonel Sartorious.

" Camp, 10 miles south of Kopal, Nov. 15, 1800. " I also request that you will communicate to Maj. Holmes that paragraph in the inclosed extract, which relates to him. I am concerned that his health should oblige him to go to Bombay; and I request you will give the enclosed letter to the Gov. in Council of that settlement."

Extract (referred to above) of a Letter from the Chief Sec. to the Government of Madras to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley.

" Fort St. George, Nov. 7, 1800. " I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 13th ult. with its enclosures, and am directed to express to you the satisfaction of the Right Hon. the Gov. in Council at the conduct of Maj. Holmes, and of the troops under his command, in the last relief of the post of Montana."

The Hon. Colonel Wellesley to the Hon. the Gov. in Council of Bombay,

Camp, 10 miles south of Kopal, Nov. 15, 1800. " Sir,—As I understand from Col. Sartorious that Maj. Holmes is about to leave Malabar, and to join his corps at Surat, 1 take this opportunity of expressing to you my high sense of the service which he has rendered to the public during the time that he has commanded the troops in the Cotiote districts. I have already taken an opportunity of mentioning, in favourable terms, his services to the government of Fort St. George ; but, as Major Holmes is about to be more immediately under your orders, I take the liberty of recommending him to your favourable notice.

(Signed) " Arthur Wellesley."[15]

Montana can be located by following the route descriptions, as also can the approximate location of the Pyche Post.

Figure 4. Probable location of Montana Fort.
Please click onto image for a larger image.

Ward and Conner describe Montana Fort as follows: -

"Montetana N.E. 8 1/2 miles from Canote was once a Military Post, there is a Redoubt on the summit of a low hill in good order but over run with wood, the inhabitants in the neighbourhood principally Nairs-several roads from the westward communicate here."[16]

That the battles to relieve Montana were protracted and fierce are apparent from the following paragraph in a much longer letter Arthur Wellesley wrote on the 10th of October 1800 to Lieut. Col. Close from Hubly. The French under Napoleon had landed in Egypt and were planning to march to India.

"I am more pressed than ever about troops. Lord Clive calls upon me to have a detachment ready to take possession of the Ceded province, and then to march to Poonah. Sir William Clarke and Uhtoffe swear that the French are coming from Egypt, and want all the native infantry I have got; on the other hand, the last relief of Montana cost us 154 men killed and wounded (most of them coolies, however), and they are crying out there because they do not see the 12th and 2nd of the 5th marching into Cannanore on the 30th September, on which day they left Seringapatam. My business is to get over these difficulties in the best manner I can, and what follows is the arrangement which I propose. In addition to every thing, I must also inform you that the fright which affects Sir William Clarke and Uhtoffe pervades Bombay, whefe, on account of the supposed danger, the 88th, which I expected in Malabar, is detained." [17]

Contained within the same letter is another fascinating paragraph where Wellesley describes the difficulties he is under due to the Pazhassi Rajah's attacks.

I now come to the most difficult part, which is Malabar. They say there is a rebellion in Wynaad, and we may hope, like Voltaire, that the Nairs of the Pyche Rajah may be strangled with ropes made of the bowels of those on the side of Yeman Nair: but still it is necessary to take measures for sustaining that post if possible. There is nothing that can be done, excepting to send into Malabar half of the 75th regiment from Mangalore. I gave orders upon that subject this day. Thus, then, I shall have provided for all the immediate calls for troops, excepting those dictated by the fears of an Egyptian invasion.[18]

Wellesley was coming under increasing pressure from the Bombay Government to release troops to take part in the Indian Army Expeditionary Force that would sail to Egypt to fight the French expeditionary force.

The Pazhassi Rajah was tying down scarce troops that are badly needed elsewhere.

So although Koothuparamba and Mattanur may seem sleepy country towns today, two hundred and ten years ago, they were at the centre of World affairs.

They provided a formidable training ground for the man who went on to become Britain's most important General, and one who would change the face of European for several generations.


[1] Brinjarries, Indian corn merchants, who used pack cattle to transport corn and other grain across much of India. These merchants were able to mobilise many hundreds and sometimes thousands of cattle to move grain. The support of these merchants was vital to the success of any 19th Century army in India. The EIC ability to pay these Brinjarries when their enemies lacked available ready money often determined the outcome of these 19th Century conflicts.
[2] For more on Anjarakandy see http://malabardays.blogspot.com/2009/01/murdoch-brown-overseer-of-randattara.html
[3]James Welsh, Military reminiscences: extracted from a journal of nearly forty years Published 1833, page 176.
[4] Lieutenants Ward and Conner, A Descriptive Memoir of Malabar, Published, 1906 & 1995. Pages 41 & 42.
[5] The dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington: Volume 1, Page 61. Published 1837
[6] Duke of Wellington: Volume 1, Page 524.
[7] The dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington: Supplementary to the First, Second, and Third Volumes Relating to India, Page 59. Edited by Lieut. Col. Gurwood.
[8] Duke of Wellington: Volume 1, Page 519.
[9] platformed jungars, Pontoon ferries, made up of pairs of country boats fitted with a platform to carry guns or men and horses over these muddy rivers during the monsoon.
[10] Duke of Wellington: Volume 1, Page 524.
[11] "The East India Military Calendar, Volume 1. page 411. Originally published in 1823.
[12] Duke of Wellington: Volume 2, Page 137.
[13] Duke of Wellington: Volume 2, Page 142.
[14] Duke of Wellington: Volume 2, Page 143.
[15] "The East India Military Calendar, Volume 1. page 411 & 413. Originally published in 1823.
[16] Lieutenants Ward and Conner, page 41.
[17] Duke of Wellington: Volume 2, Page 183.
[18] Duke of Wellington: Volume 2, Page 185.

The Malabar Rajah’s in 1797.

Walter Ewer gives us a very interesting description of the Rajahs along the Malabar Coast in 1797. Many of these gentlemen would be closely involved in the Pazhassi Rajahs struggle with the East India Company.

“It may not be amiss to give a rough statement of the Revenues, & Force of the Northern Division of the Malabar, & of the Characters of the Rajah’s, as far as I have been able to get at them.

Cherical Rajah. High spirited & independent, collects his own Country, pays regularly, & will not suffer any of our Courts. Can raise about 6500 fighting men, & pays nett 1,20,000 R’s.

The Choolia Nambyar his vassal, & commands about 2000 of the above warriors, this man is troublesome to the Rajah’s wants to make himself independent of him, to collect his own District & to pay the company. He is not to be trusted, at the Death of the Rajah, an event likely to happen soon. We may find ourselves under the necessity of allowing this, to keep him quiet, as in case of Refusal, he may perhaps draw his sword. Cotiote Rajah [2] at present in Rebellion 3500 men – 60,000 R’s.

Cartenaad Rajah. This is a very gentle well disposed man has lately succeeded his Brother. Some of his nambyars are powerful, want to be independent of him & collect themselves for the Company. The Bombay Government have listened too much to them, had this man the spirit if the Cherical, he wou’d soon settle the Business.

The Eddycherry Nambyar. One of his vassals has always been very troublesome fellow. Tippo kept him in irons at Seringpatam, & only released him in order to plague the English, he is too much at Tellicherry. The Protection of his Nambyars against him, the countenancing the impertinence of such a man as Murdoch Brown, & such insults, are the first foundation of a Revolt, & though the Rajah himself is a very mild & good tempered man, he is surrounded with high tempered chiefs. One of his Ministers, whom I saw with him cover’d the Right Flank of Gen’l Abercrombies Army against Tippoo. 5000 men, 100,000 R’s. We hold Courts in his Country.

Koormenaad Rajah. Older Brother of the Cotiote, a Cunning Villain, ready to do anything to avoid paying his Revenue. He collects the Wyanard, a fine Country from which we have never received anything. Mr. Peile made an agreement with this man to pay for 2 years due 15,000 R’s. for 1797, 20,000 for 98, 30,000 for 1799. 35,000 R’s. In all a lac, for the 5 years lease, but the Commrs interfer’d & nothing more has been heard of it since. We hold Courts in his Country, but they are not attended to. 2500 men, R’s 64,000 per annum.

Coorg Rajah This is a very powerful Prince, quite independent he pays us a Tribute to be under our Protection but we have no controul over him. He is much attached to the English. Considering the very great assistance he gave us against Tippoo we ought not, as a generous Nation, to have accepted a paltry sum, from a faithful ally. He is very rich, & has money in the Bombay Treasury: his number of troops is not known but is considerable. He pays per annum R’s. 24,000.


The Malabar Rajah’s in 1797.

Fighting men

Rps

Cherical Rajah

6,500

120,000

Cotiote

3,500

60,000

Catenaad Rajah

5,000

100,000

Koormenaad

2,500

64,000

Tillicherry & Randaterra Company

52,000

Irenaad Nambyars as always
dissatisfied & ready to revolt

2,000

22,000

Narrangole a fortified estate
in Irvanad

8,000

Pyernullah Nayrs

32,000

Wild people to the Comp’y
Polwye to the Comp’y

20,000

Kalye & Mahe taken from the Fr
about 10,000 R’s

Customs about

30,000

Bibbee of Cannanore

15,000

French Rps

10,000

19,500

Rs 547000

[3]

It can be seen from the above account that the Pazhassi Raja was not the only Raja who was giving concern to the East India Company at this time. He was also not the most powerful of the Rajahs controlling only about 3,500 armed men.

The role of the new courts and the attempts by the Commissioners of the East India Company to remove the administration of justice away from the local Rajahs can also be seen as the cause of a growing concern amongst the Rajahs who had previously been the arbiters of justice in their communities.

Ewer wrote...

We do not sufficiently consider the situation of the Rajahs, nor are they treated by us with proper respect. By suffering them to be insulted by clerks & schoolboys, we alienate their affections from us, & the Rajahs, who is not the immediate object of their insolence, feels for his neighbour, depends upon his Time coming soon.

A Prince less haughty than Tippoo, would avail himself of our ignorance & want of policy, & court their alliance: by which means, he wou'd make them his frontier against us, instead of their being ours against him. We know that he furnishes the Cotiote Rajah with ammunition.

Were the four Rajahs of Cherical, Cotiote, Caaomenaad - Kourmenaad to unite, the whole of our Indian Force could not conquer them.

By scarificing some Thousand lives, we might march through the Country & destroy Villages, Houses, but we can never can subdue it, it is covered with a Jungle almost inpenetrable, & the Roads are scarcely passable in wet weather. Two Bullocks cannot go abreast, by which means different parts of the Army, are at great distance from each other, entangled in the wood, which although so thick as to impede the Passage, is not high enough to afford shade to the sun, a fatal enemy. During 6 or 7 months of the year all Military Operations must cease, as the rains will not admit them.


The wisest & most humane Method wou'd be to give up the Country to the Rajah on certain conditions, & allow them to govern as they think proper, by which means we shou'd acquire their esteem & affection; We have already tried how Unavailing Force is, & seen what little impression has been made on the Cotiote Rajah by an Army which wou'd have frightened Tippoo. Its efforts have been confined to burning two or three good Houses, & the Villages of Peasants. But while we are distressing our Enemy, we are ruining ourselves, by the great expense we are at."

Many on the British side of the conflict had significant doubts about its legitimacy as well as the sense in going to war with the Rajah. But like so many wars this one soon spiralled out of control.

[1] British Library, OIOC IOR H/438. Folio 167. Papers Walter Ewer 1796 – 1799
[2] The title given to the man we now know as the Pazhassi Raja.
[3] British Library, OIOC IOR H/438. Folio 170. Papers Walter Ewer 1796 – 1799

Was the Pazhassi Raja Set Up? Part 1.

Sepoys in the Uniforms Worn By Madras Presidency Troops During the Pazhassi Raj Insurgency. [1]

With the defeat of Tipu's army in 1792, the local Rajah's had expected that the British would return to their settlement at Tellicherry, and to resume trading as they had previously done following the wars that had occurred over the previous century.

What they had not appreciated, was that the East India Company was no longer just a trading company, as it had formerly been.

Since changes carried out under Lord North's administration, the East India company had become effectively an extension of the British Government; in effect a state controlled company.

It had changed from a company whose main activity was trading, into one that acted more like a government organisation that increasing paid for itself by revenue or tax gathering, rather than from profits made it had formerly made from trade alone.

It's new directors included men increasingly drawn not from senior returned East India Company officials, but from senior members of the political elite and the ruling classes in Great Britain who were less familiar with India and trade than their predecessors. Their expertise was in with taxing populations and ruling either their own landed estates back in Britain, which were populated by largely compliant tenant farmers, or on behalf of an established and widely accepted government.

The companies new directors also wished to apply the lessons and company procedures that had from their point of view been successfully developed in Bengal between 1760 and 1800 to exploit the taxation of farming and other revenues, and to apply them to the newly acquired territories in Malabar.

The following Political Letter written by Mr. Duncan, describes events in 1792, and the Pyche or Pazhassi Rajah's growing role within the region.

“"That during the war, the People of the [Pyche] Raja seized on the Wynaad as part of their ancient Territory and were at the Peace in possession” and the lasted quoted address to Bombay of June 1792 continues to state “That on the 6th of May 1792 a message arrived from Tellicherry from the Raja of Cotiote, stating that an officer from Tippoo had sent to the person in charge of Wynaad to deliver it up as the right of Tippoo and that similar letters had been sent by the same person to the Raja making the same demand.” Mr. Farmer not having then left Tellicherry, the Chief and Factor requested his ideas and directions on the subject, when he advised that the Raja should instantly send word, that the country being yielded to the English, he the Raja, could give no answer till he had informed the Chief of Tellicherry, but that, as Wynaad was certainly not including in the Grants of Tippoo, it could not consistently be retained, and that therefore the Raja must order the People to withdraw to the Boundaries of Wynaad, there taking a stand, and advising the Chief; if Tippoo’s people presumed to encroach beyond that boundary which the Bombay Commissioners then believed we had no claim to the Eastwards of, in so much that on the 9th of August they wrote to Tippoo’s Subahdar Hurry Purwae apprizing him “that as at the time mentioned by the Treaty we do not find Wynaad to have been under Calicut, we do not mean therefore to detain what was granted to the Company;" [2]

The situation was not made any easier for the local East India Company administrators, by the power struggle that was going on inside the local Rajah's family. There were several local ruling families each controlling small semi-independent and competing areas or Taluks.

The Pazhassi Raja was not the paramount ruler in any of these areas, but was a subsidiary and junior aspirant to one of these territories. The senior Rajah was his uncle, and as events were to show, the younger man was impatient for power, and was seen by more senior members of his family as a threat to their positions.

Over the coming years the Pazhassi Raja was to prove himself to be the most effective war leader amongst the local ruling families.

When the war with Tipu Sultan broke out in October 1789, the other more senior Rajah's had either fled into the Tellicherry settlement or travelled down to Travancore.

They had abandoned their subject peoples to their fate. This had lost cost them much of their former moral authority.

The Pazhassi Rajah had acted with more courage and had taken to the jungles on the slopes of Ghats with the younger men, and allied to the East India Company he had waged a war of ambush and raids on the Mysore troops and supply chain travelling along the Gun Roads Tipu had built to subjugate the Wayanad and Malabar.



A Nair photographed shortly before 1909. The Nairs were the main source of warriors in the early years of the uprising. These fierce warriors were in many ways similar to Gurkhas in the way they fought, having their own characteristic curved bladed knives.[3]

These senior Rajah's and especially his uncle were to play a double game over the coming years, as they sort to restrict the Pazhassi Rajah's influence and power which was beginning to challenge their own positions.

Duncan recognised the existence of this growing power when writing on 2nd March 1797 about events in Malabar. In this letter Duncan describes the man we now know as the Pazhassi Rajah,as the Cottiote Rajah.

“the late untoward Events in one of the Northern Districts in the Malabar Province which it grieves me sorely, to have to relate, howsoever much they may appear to have primarily and in a great degree unavoidably flown, from the Rivalry and Dissentions between two Cousin Germane called the Raja’s of Coorimnad and Cottiote, the former progress and fortunate issue of which stand already narrated in the Revenue letter from this Presidency of the 18th of December last, as does their unexpected Renewal in my late address to the Secret Committee of the 12th of January of which a Duplicate is herewith sent—“

“2 You will Gentlemen already know from the first report of the Commissioners that all the Malabar Rajas feel and have indeed all along felt rather uneasy under the degree of Restraint and Submission that we have since the Peace with Tippoo Sultaun endeavoured to subject them to, among these none has been so turbulently impatient all along as the Raja of Cottiote, otherwise called for distinctions sake, and as being indeed his more proper designation the Pyche Raja, one of the members of the family of the Raja’s of that District who having during the late War with Tippoo remained in the Jungles when his other & Senior Relations fled for refuge to Travancore acquired thereby such a footing in the affections of the people, that even after his services returned at the Peace he maintained his influence, so as to have been considered by the first Joint Commissioners from Bengal and Bombay & Treated as the effective or at least the acting Raja, at the same time that, on his behalf & with his consent they settled most or all of what related to his District with the Raja of Coorimnad the son of his Mothers sister (all heirship amongst these Chieftains going in the female line) and who whom as his senior, he professed at all times the greatest deference so as to consider himself to be only the manager under his orders; but yet his conduct was on the whole so turbulent & refractory that in the year 1794 Mr. Stevens then the Supravisor concluded the five years settlement of the Coltiote District not with him but directly with the Coorimnad Raja his relation as being at the head of the house of Cottiote whereas there are several between him and the Pyche (By misnomer called by us the Cottiote Raja) in order of succession not withstanding which the Pyche Chieftain has ever since the conclusion of this quinquenial lease proved extremely restless and jealous that it became soon after my entering on my present charge a serious and pressing consideration how to proceed in regard to him, in as much as he forcibly prevented the Coorimnad’s making the Collections under the quinquennial lease, to such a degree that the latter declared he could not pretend to go on with them without a force of 5 or 600 men of our Troops, in view to all which and also to enable us in pursuance of a Recommendation to that effect, from the Bengal Government to bring him (the Pyche) to account for his conduct in having put some Mapillas of his own Authority to Death, the commanding officer on the coast (General Bowles) was not only instructed to afford the Coorimand Raja the necessary support – but it was left to the last mentioned commanding officer and to the acting Supravisor Mr Handley (comprising the Civil and Military Superior Authority on the spot) to consider whether it might not be advisable in view to saving effusion of Blood if the Pyche Raja’s person be secured so as to prevent his protracting an insurgency by betaking himself an insurgent to the Jungle. [4]

To add to the Pyche Rajah's difficulties, was that fact that he was not just opposed by the equivocal and often hostile attitudes of his older relatives, but also by the private money making activities and interests of messr's Wilkinson, Handley, Stevens, Rivett, Torin and Brown, the local officials of the East India Company based in Tellicherry, that were diametrically opposed to his.

The land the Pazhassi Rajah controlled around his village was one of the best possible areas for the production of pepper. Most of the routes to the other pepper producing areas crossed his domain. They had to get rid of the Rajah if they were to capture his profits for their own personal gain.

The salaries paid to all East India Company officials except the most senior ones, were barely sufficient to cover their expenses.

Custom and practice throughout the 17th and 18th centuries had allowed EIC officials to engage in private trade (known as the Country Trade)in order to make up the difference, as long as it did not involve voyages back to Britain. By the late 18th Century many civilian officials were making fortunes. If they survived to retire as Nabobs, they were able to remit large sums of money back to Britain. Such was the size of some of these sums returned to Britain, that the returning East India Company officials were believed to have bought as many as 84 seats in Parliament that first brought Pitt the Younger to power.

Pitt was the grandson of a former East India Company Official from Madras.

This growing "Indian" influence was too much for the established authorities back in Britain, who were in danger of losing their political power and patronage to the "Indian" lobby.

They sort to prevent such high profits being made, or at least to control who had access to them, by appointing politically acceptable officials directly to the most senior posts, thereby cutting away routes to these posts for most career East India Company officials.

By 1797 it was becoming much harder for men like Wilkinson, Handley, Rivett, Torin and Brown to make money in places like Bombay. A World War was being fought against France, trade was depressed.



Pepper Growing on Vines in the Wayanad. The ultimate cause of all the conflict.

Torin, Wilkinson and Rivett lobbied to move to Tellicherry where they hoped to engross the pepper trade for their own personal gain. They had had their attention drawn to the area by Murdoch Brown and by the profits they had been making by selling English guns to Tipu Sultan via the French port of Mahé. [5]

The Board of East India Company also desperately needed to try to recoup the cost of the war with Tipu Sultan, if it were not to reduce dividends further. It therefore decided that it had to tax the newly conquered territory in Northern Malabar.

For this it was necessary to take over the lands, or more importantly a significant share of the revenues that had formerly been paid to the local Rajahs, by the farmers and villagers occupying these districts.

Before Tipu's invasion of the Malabar, the East India Companies territory at Tellicherry had only extended about four or five miles inland, and along a narrow strip of land stretching from the outskirts of Cannanore to the southern edge of Mahé.

After previous local wars, although the British had often fought as allies with local Rajah's against other Rajah's and or against the French and the Dutch, they had not taken over significant stretches of the territory that they had been able to secure with their local allies during the course of these wars.

The local Rajah's appear to have expected that once Tipu was beaten back out of their lands, they could resume their former rule as before, and without any loss of revenues.

This time however it was different. The East India Company had expended massive sums of money, all of which had to go onto the overhead, and which would wipe out dividends for years to come. Having fought the war ostensibly on behalf of the local rulers, they believed that the local rulers and their communities ought to be made to pay back the cost of the war.

The EIC sort to ascertain the likely revenues that Malabar could provide in order to repay the cost of both the provinces administration, as well as of the war, by setting up a Commission.

Walter Ewer described the commission in the following terms.

This country is under the Government of a Commission, who execute the Office of Supervisor.(Messrs Wilkinson, Rickards and Col. Dow)

Without a comment on the abilities of these gentlemen, I shall give a short account of their proceedings. I must however mention, that the Chief is Mr. Rickard’s. A gentleman of only 7 years standing in the service, whose greatest merit seems to be, that he has found out the weak side in Mr. Duncan whose Confidence in him appears to be unbounded.

In my opinion the Commission itself is a Disgrace to a Civilised Government, it is a Commission of Enquiry, parading the Country, petitioning for, and encouraging accusations; a country whose natives are ignorant or regardless of an oath; what must be the astonishment of the Impartial Traveller, when he finds that a Junior is employed to invite Charges against his Superior, & that the Judge expects to succeed to the Station of the Criminal, on his Conviction! I shall take no notice of the loss the Company has sustained, of the services of some very able young men, as an investigation is likely to take place.

But this, and; the loss of Revenue both of which are the Consequences of the Conduct of the Commissioners, are Trifles in Comparison with the Miseries of War. How far they are concerned in these calamities the following Extracts from the Diary will shew.[6]

Whilst it must be recognised that Walter Ewer was a stern critic of the administration of Governor Duncan, and that it is possible to find other accounts of the Commission that speak just as highly of its activities, I believe that subsequent events will show that Ewer correct was correct in his assessment.

This situation was made worse by the corruption being undertaken by several of the commissioners, including Messrs. Stevens and Handley.

"Towards the middle of December 1795 Mr. Stevens, Senior, resigned the Supravisorship and was succeeded by Mr. Handley, and at the same time charges of corruption and bibery were brought before the Governor, Mr. Ducan, by the Zamorin against Messrs. Stevens, Senior, J. Agnew, and Dewan Ayan Aya, a Palghat Brahman for extorting a lakh of Rupees."[7]


The level of mismanagement and corruption is clear from the following report by Ewer.

"This province will be ruined by the Commission of Supravision if continued; as the salary is good, & the station honourable, everyone who has interest at the Presidency will exert to get down here, without considering whether he is qualified for the Station. Not to mention that the Expense is double that of the Supervisor. Gentlemen who have spent most of their Time at Bombay Contract a Habit of Contempt for the Natives, as they converse with none there, except Persee, or Hindoo Merchant’s & when they come down here, they don’t know how to make a Difference, between the Sneaking Persee, who money is his God, & who would sell his soul; & suffer every indignity for Profit, & the Independent nair, who never quits his arms, who seeks no Happiness beyond the Chace, his Liquor & his Woman. The Commissioners began their career of Tyranny, by seizing the Zamorin, whose ancestor’s were the most Powerful Princes on this Coast, a poor helpless old man; & they escaped the Punishment such an act deserved, through the astonishment of his attendants at the audacity of it. Encouraged by impunity they attempted to treat the Cotiote Rajah in the same manner, they attacked and plunder’d his palace, but could not seize his person; about 60,000 Rp’s were carried off by the Troops, besides Jewels & other things. Only 18,000 Rp’s have been restored. This has been followed by an engagement, if it may be so called in which we lost more men, than Lord Cornwallis at the Battle of Seringapatam. And our losses would have been still more considerable, had it not been for the generous forebearance of the Enemy who suffer’d several different Parties to retire un-molested. Besides the sacrifice of lives, the Revenue of the disputed District for 20 years to come, will not pay the Expenses of the War. The correspondence of the late Commissioners will shew how unfit they were for their stations. Nor does the President, now returned to the Board, to take his seat as a member of Council at Bombay, (Mr. Rivett) Shew more sense than his predecessors: While the Governor is endeavouring to settle the Dispute by Negotiations, while Mr. Peile the Superintendant, whom I have accompanied on the Expedition to the Cherical Rajah (who as a friend of both Parties, is trying to persuade the rebel Cotiote to visit the Govn General) is waiting the return of a messenger from Cotiote, we receive from Governm’t publick minute of the Commissioner complimenting the Gentlemen of the Service for their activity, & calling the Rajah a despicable or contemptible Chieftain. Such language is not much calculated to forward a negotiation with a man who at this moment is hesitating whether he shall trust himself in our hands."[8]

That this contempt for the local rulers and corruption was not the settled policy of the East India Company Directors or Governor Duncan is clear. The most experienced and one of the longest serving officials on the Malabar Coast, Mr. Peile the Northern Superintendant on the coast was working hard to reach agreement with the Pazhassi Rajah, and on several occasions they were thwarted by the active opposition of the corrupting influence of Messrs, Torin, Wilkinson, Brown, Handley and Stevens, often aided and abetted by the Rajah's uncle.

This is clearly demonstrated in the following letter.


Dear Sir
near Barrygurry Malabar April 24 1796

I have much to say to you about the affairs of this Province, but I have not time at present, as I am on a Journey, the Albion for England is expected in a day or so at Tellicherry, trusting you will keep my information secret, I give you my opinion without scruple, & have as little Hesitation in mentioning Names for the same Reason. I am now with Mr Peile the Northern Superintendant, in the Territory of the Cartenand Rajah, one of the most powerful on the Coast & am going with him in the course of the Day to his House 15 to 16 Miles off. The fatal error in all the Proceedings here, is that the Rajah’s have never been treated as gentlemen by the Com’rs enquire of Sir Robert Abercrombie, who is adored in this Country, how he behaved to them. I am afraid there is some underhand Work in this Business, & that we are in a Scrape; There is something very mysterious in Colonel Dow’s Transactions, he & the other Commissioners have quarrelled; in Short, there is nothing but confusion in the Civil Service.
I was in Hopes when I left Tillicherry, that something might be done by negotiation, & that I should have accompanied Mr. Peile the North’n Superint’t to a conference with the Cotiote Rajah. Mr. P is the only man in the Service, who dare trust himself with him, having always treated him with Civility & Respect. But, I have just heard from Tillich’y that it is determined that Sword shall decide the Contest. We must make Haste, for we have not above a fortnight, before the season closes. I shall only observe to you, we have so few officers, that the loss of a Dozen would be equal to a Defeat & any Accident to Gen’l Stewart would ruin the Army.
Orders have been sent to the Cherical Raja to furnish Troops, which he will do, with this observation, that there is hardly a man among them who has not Relations in the Cotiote Country, like orders have been sent to the Cootaly Nair, Who’s Sister is the principle Wife of the Cotiote Rajah. Time will show how much such Allies can be depended upon. You must pay but little attention to the accounts you get out of the Revenues of this Country, they may be of Consequence in Time, but, independent of the present Disturbances, such Tricks have been play’d with the Coin, as will bring heavy loss on the Company, which must now come out, besides this, little Dependence can be placed on arrears due above a year & a half, though they stand on Paper as Cash. The Spot where I now am, is all a garden, & produces everything, besides the advantage of being on the Sea Shore. Yet, though the Rajah & Superintendent, exert them selves to the utmost, the People are above a year in arrears. They are however telling them, that money we must have, or we cannot appear before the Governor, you must excuse my writing as, I am in the Midst of the noise of gunning.
I am Sir
Your most ob’t Servant
W Ewer
Rt. Hon’r Henry Dundas.
[9]

A few days later Ewer wrote yet another letter setting out the case very clearly.


Dear Sir, Tellicherry 25 Apr 1797.
Since I wrote the inclosed an Express arrived from the Governor to order Mr. P’s immediate Return to Tellicherry, to set out on some business to the North, in which I shall accompany him. The Result you will hear in Course. Allow me Sirs, to recommend this Gentleman to your notice, as whether successful or not, in the negotiation he has undertaken, he deserves attention for his Readiness in attempting it. Altho’ he is in a very good Situation at present, the want of Favor & Connections subject him to many Mortifications from his Juniors in the line & Service; & this fatal Commission, which if continued, will ruin the Country altho’ it has not driven him from the Province, as it has some other Valuable men, has often been a Clog to him, & frustrated his best endeavours, by interfering in his Duty, & thereby Lepering his Consequence in the Opinion of the Natives.
Mr. P. Is one of the oldest Revenue Servants on this side of India, but has been constantly superceded by people from every Department some of them his Juniors in the Service, He came out to India at the age of 30, & of course had more knowledge & experience of the World in General, than most Gentlemen who have been in the service that number of years, living retired, & not belonging to any set, he has formed no connections, & has nothing to depend upon, but his attention to his Duty. At the whim of the Commissioners, this Gentleman has been driven about the Province in all seasons, well or ill, & if he made any complaints it was resented by them, as a presumptuous Remonstrance, But now, in Time of Danger & Difficultly, he is the only Person we can look up to, the only man with whom the Refractory Rajah will treat, the only one who dares to go to him. Where are the haughty Commissioners?
Mr. Wilkinson, after residing a year & a half in the Province, a Time however long enough to set it up in flames, runs away to England. Then comes Mr. Rivett his partner in Trade, a merchant, Said to be a man of some abilities; but his stay here has not been sufficiently long for the Display of them. & Now Mr Torin, junior Partner in the same House succeeds to the Commission. So we see the merchant House of Rivett, Wilkinson & Torin of Bombay Governors of Malabar, every one of them totally ignorant of the Character & Persons of the Malabar Rajah’s & What is worse of the Respect due to men descended from a long Race of Princes. As to Col. Dow, I shall say nothing, his acts speak for him. I must however mention to you that all which happen’d to the Army, was foretold to me; some Time previous to the Accident, by a Gentleman at Bombay, while shewing me the maps. Mr. Spencer, Just appointed Senior Comm’r is a good natured indolent man thought by the Court unfit for Council, & now appointed to a station of tenfold consequence.
My private opinion is that these gentlemen who cannot be expected to know anything of the affairs of the Province (Mr. Torin having been commercial he resident only a few weeks, & Mr. Spencer but just arrv’d) are appointed solely that Mr. Rickards may have the whole management, he, in fact is the Supravisor, how far he is qualified, his Conduct will demonstrate. Some of the Comm’rs were so ignorant, that one asked if Paulghaut, a principle Fortress on Tippoo’s Frontier, was on the West Coast of Sumartra, & I myself saw a letter signed by two of them yesterday, about an attack & some houses burnt on the Island of Rhandaterra, a District about 7 miles from the seat of Government, with a River on one side. I beg your Pardon for troubling you with this long letter, but I think it right you shou’d be acquainted with the characters of the People employ’d in the Publick Service. I shall stay here till the Business is settled, or the Rains begin.
I am Dear Sir,
Your most obedient Servant.
W Ewer
2 Enclosures. [10]

The following paragraphs from the previous two letters are particularly significant..

"you must excuse my writing as, I am in the Midst of the noise of gunning."

"I myself saw a letter signed by two of them yesterday, about an attack & some houses burnt on the Island of Rhandaterra, a District about 7 miles from the seat of Government, with a River on one side."

As these show the start of the counter attack by the Rajah. It is highly significant that this attack falls on Rhandaterra, or Randattara as it is more normally spelt.

Randattara was the site of the new pepper plantation being started at Anjarakandi by Murdoch Brown.

This plantation was intended to grow pepper directly for the trade on lands mortgaged by the EIC and then when the payments could not be maintain, it was forfeited to the EIC who foreclosed on the local rulers a couple of decades before.

The Rajah knew full well that if this plantation succeeded, he would lose his pepper trade and therefore income. It had to be attacked.

In the next installment of this article I will explore the Rajah's response to these events, and set out the texts of some of the letters that passed between the Rajah, Governor Duncan, and how a faction of the local East India Company set about destroying any attempt at reconciliation with the Rajah for their own personal gain, and in clear contravention of the official East India Company policy.


[1] Plate C by Gerry Embleton, from Armies of the East India Company 1750 - 1850, Men-at-Arms Series 453, published by Osprey Publishing. See http://www.ospreypublishing.com/store/Armies-of-the-East-India-Company-1750%E2%80%931850_9781846034602
[2] British Library, OIOC IOR F/4/32/894. From Extract Political Letter from Bombay.
[3] From http://www.payer.de/quellenkunde/quellen1606.htm
[3] British Library, OIOC IOR F/4/32/894. From Extract Political Letter from Bombay.
[4] http://malabardays.blogspot.com/2007/12/murdoch-brown-1750-1828-early-days.html
[5] British Library, OIOC IOR H/438. Papers Walter Ewer 1796 – 1799. Folio89.
[6] Malabar Manual By William Logan, Vol. 1, Page 511.
[7] British Library, OIOC IOR H/438 Folios 111. Papers of Walter Ewer 1796 – 1799.
[8] British Library, OIOC IOR H/438 Folios 6-7 Papers of Walter Ewer 1796 – 1799.
[9] British Library, OIOC IOR H/438. Papers Walter Ewer 1796 – 1799.